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Writing the History of a C.P.
NO HISTORY CAN BE W RITTEN without a conscious or un­
conscious philosophy or world-view underlying it, because it is the 
philosophy of the author which will determine what he understands 
by a historical fact; how he will order these historical facts in a 
pattern; and, finally, how he will give more importance to some facts 
than to others to establish a pattern or hierarchy which enables 
him to discover what is significant and deserves the most emphasis 
in his work. This generalisation applies to the writing of the history 
of communism as much as to any other sphere of history.
The adequacy of a historical work is determined first by the 
validity of its philosophical base and then by its “facts”, for what 
are “facts” and what is “correct” is something which can only be 
established in philosophical terms. It may be that in time there 
will be general agreement that there is only one valid philosophical 
criterion to decide the adequacy of “facts”, but at present there 
are at least three philosophical positions of major importance in 
historical scholarship whose theories of knowledge differ so much 
that there can never be agreement between them as to what consti­
tutes a “correct fact”. The truthfulness of this proposition is more 
evident in disputes over macrocosmic facts like a revolution than 
microcosmic facts like what is understood by the notion of a date 
but it holds for all “facts”.
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The three major philosophical schools which rule in historical 
scholarship today (not that the historical practitioners are always 
conscious of it) are the idealist school, the empirical or positivist 
school, and the historicist school. The first have a theory of know­
ledge which maintains that facts are the product of men’s minds; 
that knowledge or understanding is antecedent to the facts; that 
consciousness precedes material and sometimes, that God made 
the world. The second group maintains the contrary: that material 
precedes consciousness; that the concept of the fact lies in the fact 
itself, and that facts produce men’s minds. The third school maintains 
that material and consciousness are two faces of the one coin, 
neither being precedent to the other, both being inconceivable with­
out the other, and that the development of knowledge is not by 
production but by a dialectical process.
The first two are fundamentalist schools who merely reverse 
each other’s propositions, and the third a historicist school. The 
first two have ideological origins and not historical origins. The 
idealist school maintains that the validity of ideas (and ideas are the 
most tricky of “facts”) can be determined according to a criterion 
outside history, outside the ideas themselves, a revealed or trans­
cendent criterion (e.g. God, the Bible, intuition). The second do 
exactly the same by returning to First Causes, though in their case 
they claim the ultima ratio for material rather than God. For them 
dispute is solved by returning to the “facts”, understanding facts 
in a crude raw sense, and failing to distinguish between facts and 
the concept of facts, assuming the unknowable, the existence of the 
facts independent of men’s consciousness of them. Only the third 
school starts from the existing historically structured environment 
instead of looking for first causes, and accepts the presence of the 
individual consciousness and the environment of facts as the condi­
tions precedent for establishing the theory of knowledge, and that 
ideas can be tested for their validity by the application of human 
rationality which can compare them against the real.
The three philosophies emerged in a succession and developed 
from each other; they constitute a progress in understanding. The 
first we can find already present in the writings of the Church 
fathers; the second was the vogue from the eighteenth century on­
wards and had its heyday late in the nineteenth century and the 
third was a product of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All 
have exponents among contemporary historians. We can place 
Butterfield and Manning Clark among the first school, Lewis Namier 
and Ian Turner in the second, and Benedetto Croce and Antonio 
Gramsci in the third. Not a single notable Anglo-Saxon historian, 
much less an Australian, comes to mind as an exponent of the 
third philosophical method —  the only one which is not obsolete.
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In the Anglo-Saxon world we are faced with an atrophy of historical 
research, in its ideological stage. We are faced with pre-historicist 
history.
This lag of historical practice is not inevitable, as it is not present 
in European historical research, where, as I have pointed out, major 
historians have a historicist philosophical base, either in theory, as 
with Croce, or in theory and practice, as with Gramsci, but it is 
explicable in terms of Anglo-Saxon failure to keep up with philoso­
phical developments made “in foreign parts”.
Within the insularity of Anglo-Saxon historical scholarship (Aus­
tralian scholarship belongs within this too), the idealists are regarded 
as old-hat, if not as nuts. The ruling vogue is the pragmatic empir­
icism of the positivist group, who periodically savage the idealists 
(usually mistaking historicists for idealists because they know 
nothing of non Anglo-Saxon developments). Recently we were 
treated to an example of this in the attack on Manning Clark’s his­
tory in Australia, but a running battle has been conducted for many 
years in England against Toynbee and Butterfield by the pupils of 
Namier. The Namier school of history epitomises the style of Anglo- 
Saxon historical scholarship. Carrying one side of Ranke’s teaching 
to a ridiculous conclusion, they claim to have eliminated great 
theories and philosophy from history by going back to the facts. 
Massive detail is used to demolish attempts to understand. What 
none of this school seems to understand is that they too belong to 
a philosophical tradition; they are not writing objective history but 
positivist history. They cannot attack the idealists without attacking 
themselves as their position is merely idealism stood on its head.
I can almost hear a sigh of relief from marxist historians at the 
mention of Namier, who was nothing if not an enemy of marxism.
I reply, most Anglo-Saxon and Australian marxist historians also 
belong with him through their positivist understanding of marxism. 
An economic determinist who believes in writing history in whch 
institutional developments are always explicable in terms of economic 
and social developments has more in common with Namier than 
with marxism because he shares the same philosophy which is not 
only passe but ideological in its origins.
We can get no guidance for writing a communist history from 
Anglo-Saxon historical scholarship and the criteria it uses, as it 
is almost without exception, marxist or non-marxist, positivist in 
its orientation and therefore both out-of-date and ideological. Its 
theory of knowledge and world-view is inadequate to its own object. 
To understand how to write any history we should look at European 
historical scholarship in the historicist tradition, as here we have a 
methodology adequate to its object.
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II
The practical differences in approach of the Anglo-Saxon school 
and the Continental school, which is so much in advance of it 
philosophically, can be gauged by the recent criticism of Paolo 
Spriano’s massive three volume Storia del Partito Comunista Italians, 
recognised generally as the best history of a communist party ever 
written. Spriano is a communist, an activist and a scholar, and one 
of Italy’s leading historians. Essentially, his history is a history of 
the leading groups of the party, their relationship with the Comintern 
and the policies thrashed out on the dialectic of that relationship.
International critics were asked three questions:
1 This history of the PCI is essentially the history of a national 
section of the Communist International. As such, how far is it indica­
tive of a general process?
2 As Gramsci asked himself, is it possible to write the history 
of a political party? To what extent must it also be the history 
of a country? The problem is particularly difficult, because it is a 
question of a Party which is part of a centralised international 
movement and because it lived almost from its inception in condi­
tions of illegality.
3 Spriano seems to share the thesis that the history of a party 
is in the first place the history of its directive groups. Is this method 
correct and what novelty does it introduce?
Giuseppe Berti (leading historian of PCI, non-communist) pointed 
out that anti-communists were critical of Spriano’s history because 
it emphasised too much the positive aspects of the leadership but 
“in this world it is really difficult to make everyone happy”. Berti 
went on to say that the harshest criticism had come from communist 
leaders. He replied to the first question in the affirmative:
W ithout com m itting the  sin o f patriotism , w e could  even say that from this 
poin t o f view  the PC I’s history offers an optim um  positive quality  and can 
therefore be told  w ith  least d ifficu lty  by a m ilitan t. W hat there is in  it which  
is negative is ow ed (not com pletely, but prevailingly) to the coefficient o f  sub­
ordination of the policies o f the PCI to those o f Moscow . . .
In reply to the second question Berti said:
T o  m e there seems no foundation  to the objection  (that it  is insufficiently  
inserted in to  the history o f  the country) and that this seems a false problem  
from a historiographical p o in t o f view. T h e  history of a country can be 
w ritten from various perspectives, as econom ic history, as d ip lom atic history, 
as the history of p o litica l parties and religious com m unities (think o f the 
R eform ation and the C ounter-R eform ation) and so on, and, in  m odern  
history, th e  horizon has a tendency to extend  to problem s o f  European and 
world history. M oreover, this characteristic is particularly evident in  the  
history o f a m ovem ent like the com m unist m ovem ent w hich  is in ternation­
alist. T h u s there arises the suspicion that he w ho insists a great deal that 
greater stress should  be la id  on general developm ents o f Ita lian  history, has
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n o  great desire to go deeper into and discuss the burning questions (national 
and international) o f the com m unist m ovem ent in  its totality, and w ould  
prefer to drown everything in  a wave of historical happenings. T oday the  
writer o f  the history of com m unism  in  reality faces a m ore d ifficu lt task 
than that presented to historians o f  the n ineteenth  century, when they tried  
to write the history of Jacobinism  w hich was the history of France from the  
E nlightenm ent to the R evolution, but w hich was also the history o f som e­
th in g  else . . .  as the historians w ho tackled this question  from different 
points o f view  from Barruel to A lbert Sorel, from M athiez to m ore recent 
historians: realised the history of a country and o f the m ovem ent o f  European  
ideas.
In response to the third reproach, Berti said that it was banal:
Let us take for exam ple a subject w hich is a little  less heatedly contested: 
the history o f the Action Party in  the R isorgim ento. I belong in  fact to 
the group of historians which sought patiently  (and above all) to bring to 
light the class links o f that leading group w ith  the substratum of young  
in te llectuals and workers w hich foretold  the working class, o f the peasants 
w hom  in  certain cases the A ction Party tried to lean on certain m ovem ents. 
W hat cam e from it? Enriched, certainly by new  facts (or rather facts w hich  
were know n in more detail and position) what cam e from it was precisely  
th e  h istory of th e  d irec tive  group . And it  should be noted that the enrich ­
m ent itself was possible not in one of the first reconstructions o f historical 
scholarship, but in the latest in  order o f tim e, a century after the first 
attem pts to write a history o f  th e  Action Par tv.
Milos Hajek (Czech historian of the Comintern) said that linking 
a party’s history with that of the country was much less important 
in the case of a propagandist party than a strong ruling party. In 
the case of parties related to the Comintern, the Comintern was 
probably much more important than anything that went on in the 
country of origin. He pointed out furthermore that the study of 
communist parties was in its initial stage and that in the case of of­
ficial histories tracing connection of party and the masses, they 
started from a falsified and a priori view of history of the country. 
He agreed entirely that the CPI and he added the Soviet, French, 
Polish, Czech and German parties should be studied above all at the 
directive level. “A history of a Communist Party would be vulgarly 
deformed if it did not single out the real development of its policies, 
arid how far they were determined by its leaders (as well as by the 
Comintern).”
Robert Paris (French militant intellectual):
Certainly the choice o f Spriano . . . w ithou t doubt w ill seem embarrassing  
to those w ho w ould  like to find , in  the evolu tion  of an organism  lik e  that 
of the PCI, the equivalent o f that ‘h istory of the subaltern classes’ w hich  
Gramsci hoped for, or, to cite Jaures, ‘a fresco o f  a w hole im m ense m ultitud e  
of m en w ho are finally com ing in to  the light': to those, in  sum , w ho w ould  
like a substitu tion  of th e  history o f the class struggle for that o f ru ling groups 
or classes. But it is certain that the history of a com m unist party of the  
classical type like the PCI, cannot be w edded, or at best in  an extrem ely  
indirect and m ediated  way, in to  w hat w e call social history.
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Paris went on to say that the history of communist parties belongs 
in the history of sociology of organisations. Paris agreed too that if 
the scenario was Italian the direction was elsewhere, in the Comintern 
and the international movement.
Eric Hobsbawm (guess what, we know him!), the only Anglo- 
Saxon marxist and economic determinist to boot, was the only dis­
senter. He said:
In general, no peculiar aspect and no institu tion  of any country can be 
separated from their context w ithou t som e deform ation or lack. L ife cannot 
be divided  up  w ithou t losing life.
W e can criticise Spriano for not having em phasised the (national) context 
adequately.
He went on:
As to the history of a party seen in  terms of its d irective groups, it is evidently  
insufficient, because it neglects the activity, the  attitudes etc. o f  the masses 
which — often  for reasons d ifferent from those adm itted by the  leadership  — 
support it . . . It is to be hoped  that in  the third  o f  Spriano’s volum es, the  
history o f the com m unist party w ill be w ritten  from below  as w ell as from  
on top.
The clear opposition between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental 
critics, the first claiming that history is a totality whose parts cannot 
be considered separately and the second asserting, the contrary and 
indeed claiming that more is lost than gained by the global approach 
is explicable only in terms of their philosophical positions. Although 
all are marxists, and I stress here that being a marxist is not all- 
important in understanding history, (what is crucial is what sort of a 
marxist you are), Hobsbawm still subscribes to the pre-humanist 
economic determinist variety of marxism in both his theory and his 
practice, where two of the others, Berti and Paris are “humanist” 
marxists. (I am not able to comment on Hajek beyond noting that 
in his practice he is the “humanist” variety of marxist too).
The positivist version of marxism espoused and maintained by 
Hobsbawm accepts the notion of production and therefore the 
notion that superstructural phenomena like political parties are 
caused by conditions in certain social classes whose existence is 
owed to a certain division of labour stemming from the prevailing 
mode of production within the society. Thus one is not explicable 
without the other. A communist party and its history cannot be 
studied independent of the conditions within which it arises, these 
conditions being stated a priori according to a positivist view of 
marxism, to be matters like the economic and social history of the 
society. In turn, because Hobsbawm understands the progress of 
history in the positivist way, Theory (marxism) itself becomes an 
expression of the working class; the study of revolution and how to 
make it becomes the study of the progression of common sense
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among the masses to a refined level, something viewed as an auto­
matic process in which no mediation of an extraneous sort is present. 
The practical preoccupations of Hobsbawm testify to this assertion. 
He is interested in the history of Gramscian “common sense”, not as 
a part of history, but as History. In doing so he, of course, ignores 
what is implicit in Leninism, that is the notion of the party as 
something extraneous to the masses which brings Theory from the 
outside and whose history is not history of the masses though it may 
be related to it.
The humanist marxist, because he does not subscribe to the 
notion of the establishment of any institution according to a theory 
of production, is prepared at least to accept the Gramscian proposi­
tion that:
W e do n ot consider sufficiently that m any p olitical acts are owed to internal 
organisational needs, tied to the need  to give coherence to a party, a group, 
a society. T h is, for exam ple, is clear from  the history o f  the Catholic Church. 
W e w ould  not succeed if  w e attem pted to find the im m ediate explanation  for 
every ideological struggle inside the Church in  the developm ents in  the  
base: m any econom ic and p olitica l novels have been w ritten on  these lines. 
Indeed, it is clear that the greater part o f  these struggles are for organisational 
and sectarian needs. In the discussion betw een Rom e and Byzantium  on  
the nature of the H oly Ghost it w ould  be ridiculous to seek the cause of 
the claim  that the H oly  Ghost derives from  the Father only, in  the econom ic  
base o f Eastern Europe, and in  the econom ic base o f the W est the cause o f the  
claim  that the H oly Ghost derives from  the Father and the Son. T h e  two 
churches, whose existence and in fluence depend on  the econom ic base and 
on history, have adopted positions w hich provide distinct principles and  
in ternal organisational cohesion for each, b u t each could have chosen the  
position  adopted by the other; the d istinct principles and conflict w ould  
have been  m aintained  just the same, and it is this problem  o f d istinct p rin ­
ciples and conflict w hich constitutes the real historical problem , not the  
arbitrarily chosen flag o f each of the parties.
Instead, accepting the historicist philosophy according to which 
the will of men and rationality, understood as a dialectical result 
of application of the consciousness to the material, are responsible 
for the creation of the “superstructure” in all its manifestations, he 
admits that there is not an a priori relationship between political 
parties and base. This is not the same as denying that there may be a 
relationship if the evidence shows that there is. This brings me to 
some issues facing an author of a history of the Communist Party 
of Australia.
I l l
When I completed the substance of my History of the Communist 
Party of Australia in 1966 (the bulk was written in 1965) I certainly 
did not know much about the developments in historical methodology 
in the European countries and I had a noli me tangere respect for 
the practitioners of history in this country and the Anglo-Saxon world
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generally. The intellectual hegemony exerted by the Canberra school 
of labour historians over me was great and difficult to escape. How­
ever, even before embarking on the doctoral research which was the 
base of the part of the book from the CPA’s beginnings to the end 
of the Second World War, I had rejected in my practice, even if not 
on a formed theoretical level, the notion that marxism was economic 
determinism. I will not single out by name the men who insisted 
from the ivory towers that labour history was marxist history (a 
populist distortion) and that the explanation for practically all poli­
tical developments were to be found in the base. I do remember 
rejecting out of hand the value of this notion as it did not conform 
to my experience of reality, which unlike theirs consisted of a con­
siderable period working in the working class in a highly class­
conscious society. Not surprisingly in an environment like that of 
“marxist” scholars in Australia, this led to their believing that I 
was not a marxist. Unlike them I believe that there is some relation 
between theory and practice and that it is real experience which 
determines the validity of a theory.
In the Short History of the CPA I continued what was then a 
heretical viewpoint for marxists in Australia, a belief that the raw 
material would dictate what was significant. I note here that this 
is not the same as the positivist method and that an unconscious 
philosophy is not necessarily less coherent than a conscious one. 
Indeed, the true philoophy can most often be found in the practice. 
The net result was, that after reading everything which I had listed 
in my bibliography and more (it is not necessary to throw Namier 
out the window as his methodological canons are as relevant to 
marxist historians as elsewhere) I came to the conclusion that the 
central theme in CPA history was the dialogue between local exigen­
cies and central orders. I did not assume a rigid theoretical schema 
according to which there must be some connection with the develop­
ments in the working class and the economic base and torture my 
facts to suit my theory. To borrow from Freud, on occasion the 
economic situation provided the same environment as illness or 
tiredness does for slips of the tongue, but it did not explain the slip 
of the tongue. Even in the great depression men’s rationality and 
their wills decided what would be done; the economic base decided 
nothing, it never does; it produced nothing, it never does.
Naturally, because I am as intellectually lonely as anyone who 
makes his way against the mainstream (it is no consolation that I 
believe the mainstream to be ideological in its origins and to have 
dubious populist overtones whose nature could be best discovered 
by comparative studies of the national-socialist roots of fascism) 
I have been overjoyed to discover: 1) that the most advanced schools 
of marxism are anti economic determinist and refuse to admit the
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arrant totalitarian nonsense that an institution must be examined 
in a social and economic context before it can be explained and, 2) 
that the most acclaimed history of a communist party, while infinitely 
superior to my stop-gap effort, also took the same partial approach 
(history is a totality only in the non-imperative sense) which has 
been applauded as the only way to study a communist party.
I have this to say to those who wish to write a definitive history 
to follow my “stopgap” history. First; the history should not auto­
matically be a history of the “rank and file” or the working class 
masses as Doug White demanded for this would be to lapse into 
the old populist error which confused the history of revolution with 
the history of common-sense. Critics of his ilk have learnt nothing 
from the Leninist distinction between spontaneity and consciousness. 
I believe the Arena group has accepted bastard theories to shore up 
its own petty-bourgeois romanticism (neither White nor any of the 
supposed supporters of Mao Tse-tung’s theories or those of Althusser 
are either Maoists or Althusserians). Second; the history should not 
automatically be set against the socio-economic background, as this 
is the practice of a economic determinist (pace Rex Mortimer who 
made several other valid criticisms of my book). Third; the author 
should prepare himself by boning up on the latest marxist philosophy 
and its historical practitioners and this means leaving Anglo-Saxon 
shores and going to Europe. I have only this to say in conclusion 
to those horrified by their lack of tools enabling them to do this. 
If Louis Althusser decided that he had to learn German before he 
could study Marx, surely a few years learning Western European 
languages is a condition precedent for keeping up with contemporary 
marxist philosophy? And if Althusser considered his ignorance of 
what went on over the mountains a disgraceful chauvinism, surely 
Australian marxists are just as offending and had best look at their 
own theoretical paraphernalia before they embark on either writing 
or criticism. Finally, one warning about short-cuts: Those who 
popularise a contemporary marxist sociology like that of Althusser 
on the basis of the Allen Lane translation of less than half his 
preliminary work do a disservice to Althusser, to themselves, and to 
the working-class movement. The same moral applies to those who 
wish to write a history of the CPA.
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